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**The Phenomenological Movement:
Forerunners, Contemporaries,
and Successors of Husserl's Philosophy**

**Il movimento fenomenologico:
precursori, contemporanei
e successori della filosofia di Husserl**

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ABSTRACTS

F. FELLMANN, *La proto-fenomenologia di Rudolf Eucken*

The enduring success of Husserl's phenomenology is due to its rigorous scientific presentation, yet it immediately conveys a worldview that at that time found its greatest exponent in Eucken. The highlighting of this apparently paradoxical thesis can, in my opinion, shed new light on Eucken's thought. In this contribution I will describe Eucken's position in three steps, within the context of late 19th and early 20th-century German philosophy: (1) I will consider "idealism of action" in reference to Rudolf Eucken's worldview; (2) I will reconstruct Husserl's evolution from logical positivism to the phenomenology of the world of life through transcendental idealism; (3) I will show how Husserl and Eucken are both constantly looking for a solid concept of reality.

D. SERON, *Brentano et Husserl sur les valeurs*

The aim of this paper is to provide a comparison between Husserl and Brentano on the issue of ethical values. The paper details the Brentanian background of Husserl's views and then discusses what seems to be the most fundamental difference between the two authors. The underlying idea is twofold. First, Husserl defends a value realism in direct opposition to Brentano's ethical objectivism. Second, the key for understanding Husserl's conception of values can be found in the *Logical Investigations*. To some extent, this conception may be viewed as a translation in axiological terms of the *Prolegomena's* argument for logical idealism.

F. PISANO, *The Factual Genesis of Judgment. What is at Stake in the Husserl-Sigwart Debate*

What is the logical form of judgments, if they have one? This question remains an enigma for any transcendental approach to logical thought. The paper addresses the matter by following the debate between Edmund Husserl and Christoph Sigwart from 1890 to 1904. It shows the pivotal role that the problem of judgment played in this discussion. Since judgments were thought to be both refined mental acts and fundamental logical elements, the related issue was a thumbnail version of the broader conflict between psychology and logic. The paper argues that Husserl, far from overcoming Sigwart's "Kantian-psychologistic" approach, ends up integrating it into the later stages of his phenomenological work; and that this approach does in fact pose an unavoidable transcendental-genetic problem for Husserl's phenomenology of logic. The argument intends to contribute to a possible integration of the study of the factual "nature" of men within the horizon of the philosophical logic of knowledge.

D. NUCCILLI, *Species, Ideas and Stories. Schapp between Phenomenological Platonism and Anti-Platonism*

The aim of this paper is to identify a shift of perspective on so-called phenomenological Platonism as the methodological dividing line between the Schapp of *Contributions to Phenomenology of Perception* and the Schapp of *Entangled in Stories*. In order to do so, we will move along a

conceptual line within phenomenology that explores the relationship between the universal and the particular, especially by investigating some passages from Husserl's and Reinach's inquiries. As shown by *Contributions*, Schapp deviated from Husserl's method in favour of Reinach's perspective early on in his career, adopting certain specific notions which were to be critically developed in his last "philosophy of stories". By investigating one of the central issues in Schapp's philosophical shift, I wish to suggest that he foreshadowed and later criticized that phenomenological current closer to realism that was to be developed by J. Hering, H. Conrad-Martius and R. Ingarden, in the footsteps of Reinach's "return to Plato".

E. BACCARINI, *E. Husserl, R. Ingarden ed E. Stein. Tra fenomenologia, ontologia e metafisica*

«Sicut enim est dispositio rerum in esse, ita et in veritate». «Veritas in nostro intellectu ex hoc est quod adaequatur rei intellectae». Recalling Aristotle in his *Summa Theologiae*, Saint Thomas explicitly states that «eadem est dispositio rerum in esse et veritate». An appeal to such Classical conceptions is required here in order to highlight the deep changes which have occurred in the evolution of Western thought, especially in the Modern period, with regard not only to understanding, but also to the capacity to understand both the objectivity of being and the being of the object itself. The purpose of my brief remarks is not to provide a systematic discussion of the problem, but rather to offer an initial clarification, following in the footsteps of three contemporary thinkers who devoted considerable attention to this topic: E. Husserl, the father of Phenomenology, and his most important pupils, R. Ingarden and E. Stein. Indeed, it is in the phenomenological realm that the issue has been debated at length and in the most creative and fruitful way.

G. PECCHINENDA - L. BIFULCO, *Husserl's Legacy and the Phenomenological Approach in Social Sciences*

This article foregrounds the relevant legacy of Husserl's philosophy in relation to the phenomenological approach of the social sciences. In particular, we focus on two topics: Firstly, the sociological phenomenology related to Alfred Schütz. His work, revolving around the construction of social realities, owes many intuitions to Husserl: from the analysis of everyday life to the problem of intersubjectivity, from *epoché* to the importance of typifications for consciousness. The second topic is the construction of the sense of reality outlined by the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset, who developed his theoretical formulation on the basis of Husserl's ideas of *eidos* and person. Finally, Ortega's conception allows the phenomenological social sciences to develop a narrative turning point.

A. TSOULOS, *Die transzendente Phänomenologie des jungen Landgrebes zwischen Psychologie und Daseinsanalyse*

This paper explores the philosophical activity of the young L. Landgrebe. Following some hints from his epistolary exchange with E. Husserl, it undertakes a reconstruction of the two leading questions in his first *Habilitation* project: How does psychology originate and how does it derive its concepts from our self-understanding? The first question leads to the structure of *In-der-Welt-sein*. But does it really represent a radical and primordial concept of subjectivity? Or does it still presuppose the world as existent, thus hiding the very problem of the dual essence of subjectivity? I

shall argue that for Landgrebe *In-der-Welt-sein* cannot be understood as the main structure of subjectivity because of its presuppositions of world and Being. Their *understanding* must be rather approached by a transcendental questioning, which does not offer a mere account of subjectivity as part of the world. In this sense, I shall also suggest that Landgrebe's work has to be read as a critique of the very foundations of Heidegger's hermeneutical understanding of Phenomenology, which takes *In-der-Welt-sein* as the ultimate point of reference for his analysis of *Dasein*.

L. GUIDI, *Sensibility and Situated Understanding: Patočka's Reassessment of Heidegger's Phenomenology*

This paper analyzes Patočka's reassessment of Heidegger's phenomenology by examining his critical reformulation of Heidegger's notion of situated, affective understanding. The paper approaches this topic by focusing in particular on the Lectures which Patočka gave at the Philosophical Faculty of Prague's Charles University in the academic year 1968-1969. In the introduction, the paper briefly sketches out Patočka's critical examination of Husserl's phenomenology, according to the necessity to expand it beyond what Patočka considers to be Husserl's subjectivistic account of consciousness. In the second section, this paper analyses Patočka's critical appropriation of Heidegger's phenomenological account of being-in-the-world by investigating the practical dimension of *Dasein*'s understanding. In the third section, Patočka's criticism of Heidegger will be examined, so as to show how Patočka's notion of sensibility and affection as "harmony with the world" – in contrast to Heidegger's account – represents a dimension of experience, which enables a situated, affective understanding and allows humans to "be at home" from the very beginning – in contrast to the *Unheimlichkeit* (literally: not-being-at-home) which Heidegger ascribes to *Dasein*.

N. ZAMBON, *Teoria del mondo della vita. Blumenberg lettore e critico di Husserl*

The "theory of the life-world" marks the height of Blumenberg's philosophy; the issue is broached in *Lifetime and World Time* (1986), on the one hand, and in the posthumously published works *Description of Man* (2006), *Theory of the Life-World* and *Phenomenological Writings* (2018), on the other hand. Setting out from Blumenberg's critical analysis of Husserl's genetic phenomenology, this article endeavours to reconstruct and interpret the most important aspects of Blumenberg's theory of the life-world. Special attention is paid to the "concept of reality", whose historical configurations Blumenberg addresses and which conceives those self-evident structures of meaning that shape everyday human experience.

D. MERSCH, *Emmanuel Levinas' Ethik der Ästhetik*

With few exceptions, Emmanuel Levinas did not write about art, nor did he leave any texts on philosophical aesthetics behind. Nevertheless, it is possible to reconstruct the basic principles of his aesthetic thinking from his work. The early essay *Reality and its Shadow* apparently contains a critique of art but, if read correctly, it rather reveals a critique of aestheticism. This criticism is made from an ethical perspective, so that in Levinas' case one must speak of an "ethics of aesthetics", in which the ethical approach remains a priori everywhere. On the other hand, his philosophy of alterity, with the central *topos* of the "nakedness of the face", is based on a decisive

aesthetic motif that seems to precede ethics. The expression "face" (*visage*), however, concerns an invisible hollow, so that its aesthetic experience can only be understood on the basis of a primary ethical relationship. The primordially of the ethical becomes equally clear in Levinas' explicit engagement with art and artistic work, especially in the text *Obliteration*, which applies the paradigm of erasure to Sacha Sosno's sculptures. If one wishes to judge Levinas' aesthetics appropriately, it is important to take into account this constantly changing relationship between ethics as the true *prima philosophia* and the indispensability of the aesthetic element.

P. RICŒUR, *L'ultimo Wittgenstein e l'ultimo Husserl sulla questione del linguaggio*

This article presents an edited version of lectures given by Paul Ricœur at Johns Hopkins University in April 1966. Ricœur offers a comparative analysis of Wittgenstein's and Husserl's late works, taking the problem of language as the common ground of investigation for these two central figures of phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Ricœur develops his study in two parts. The first part considers Husserl's approach to language after the *Logical Investigations* and concentrates on *Formal and Transcendental Logic*; leaving a transcendental reflection on language behind it re-examines a phenomenological conception, according to which the sphere of logic is not separable from that of experience. The main focus of the second part is Wittgenstein's later philosophy as it moved on from the conception of an isomorphic relation between language and the world, as set out in the picture theory in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, to the more pragmatic notion of a language-game in the *Philosophical Investigations*. In order to get beyond the irrevocable differences between the two philosophies and the unresolved theoretical issues on both sides, Ricœur suggests turning to a semiological paradigm based on the Saussurean distinction between "language" and "speaking".

J-M. TÉTAZ, *Paul Ricœur, Filosofia del linguaggio ed ermeneutica. Alcune osservazioni su L'ultimo Wittgenstein e l'ultimo Husserl sulla questione del linguaggio.*

The conference *Le dernier Wittgenstein et le dernier Husserl sur le langage* («The last Wittgenstein and the last Husserl on language») of April 1966, in connection with the course on language that Ricœur gave in 1966-67, allows to give a glance to the work of the philosopher. It reveals how, in discussion with Wittgenstein and Husserl, the philosopher puts into practice a questioning in Kantian style on the possibility for the language to make reference, that is, to have a meaning. This question will remain central throughout the further hermeneutics of Ricœur. A careful reading of the conference brings to underline three other essential themes of this hermeneutics: the problem of the questioning back (*Rückfrage*), which will serve as a methodical basis for Ricœur's ontological questioning, the problem of the ontological presuppositions of all hermeneutics (accessible only with the questioning back), and the importance of the distancing for the constitution of the sense. So, Ricœur's philosophy of language lays the foundation of his hermeneutics of the text.